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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the possible effects of foreign
acquisition on the defense industrial base in the semiconduc-
tor industry. The problems and benefits of foreign acquisi-
ti.n are assessed in order to determine the consequences of
foreign acquisition for industries critical to U.S. national
security. Foreign investment in these critical areas has the
attention of top officials in the legislative and executive
branch, as evidenced by the passage of the Exon-Florio amend-
ment. This legislation was intended to give the federal
government the authority to prohibit foreign acquisition in
cases where national security was a concern. This thesis
examines foreign acquisition prior to the passage of Exon-
klorio in order to discover whether such takeovers lead to the
loss of such companies to the defense industrial base.
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I. FOREIGN INVESTMENT: A CAUSE FOR CONCERN
A. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing concern about foreign investment in the
defense industrial base, particularly in the semiconductor
industry. This thesis will endeavor to examine seven
companies that were acquired by foreign concerns prior to the
passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment. This legislation gave
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States more
power to review and investigate foreign acquisition of U.S.
firms.
1. Research Objective
The research objective is to examine the foreign
acquisition of U.S. firms in a specific industry critical to
national security and to determine if there is a problem with
foreign investment in these firms.
2. Research Question
The primary question of this research is, "What is the
effect of foreign acquisition of U.S.-based semiconductor
manufacturing companies on the defense industrial base?"
In addition the following subsidiary questions were
formulated:
- What is the concern related to the defense industrial
base regarding foreign ownership of companies which were
previously owned by American interests?
- How can we identify and measure the impact of foreign
acquisition of U.S.-based firns in the defense industiial
base?
- Why is the semiconductor industry critical to the defense
industrial base?
- What is the purpose of the Exon-Florio amendment with
regard to foreign acquisition of U.S. firms?
- Do these findings support the assumptions underlying the
Exon-Florio Amendment and the larger concerns regarding
the defense industrial base?
- What has been the impact of foreign acquisition of U.S.-
based firms in the semiconductor industry on the defense
industrial base?
3. Methodology
The research methodology was twofold. First, a
comprehensive literature review was conducted on the defense
industrial base (DIB), the semiconductor industry, and the
Exon-Fiorio Amendment. This review focused on semiconductor
companies purchased by foreign concerns prior to the passage
of Exon-Florio, on passage of Exon-Florio and on the status of
these semiconductor companies which were acquired by foreign
interests before Exon-Florio took eff t.
Telephone interviews were also conducted with
representatives of the seven semiconductor companies that had
been acquired prior to Exon-Florio and also with staff members
of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
'CrIUS), and the Office of Industrial Base Assessment.
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B. DISCUSSION
"We believe that there are only winners, no losers, and
all participants gain from it." --President Ronald Reagan
Foreign investment has played a critical role in the
economic development of the United States. Foreign capital
contributed heavily to the building of canals and railroads as
well as factories and mines. By the end of the 19th century
America had outstripped its rivals to become the leading
manufacturer in the world. Although heavily in debt to most
European countries, America rapidly advanced beyond the
manufacturing capacity of its creditors in terms of industry
growth and potential. [Ref. l:p. 275]
As an aspect of U.S. foreign policy, foreign investment
has been at the forefront. After the American Revolution,
foreign investment continued at a very significant rate and
was welcomed by the new government. Secretary of the
Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, issued the first paper on
foreign investment, entitled the "Report on Manufacturers,"
which set forth his government's policy. He wrote, "Foreign
investment should be encouraged because it would permit an
increased amount of productive labor and useful enterprise to
work". [Ref. 1:p. 275]
Today, foreign investment comprises a wide variety of in-
dustries from high tech firms, real estate, and finance com-
panies to U.S. Government Bonds. The foreign financed debt
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currently sits at about 11 percent of the national debt or
approximately $240 billion dc Lars. [Ref. l:p. 10]
C. BENEFITS
Many arguments are presented both for and against direct
foreign investment. Dr. Donald A. Hicks, a former Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, argues
that:
It's time to stop thinking about the nationality of a firm's
parent and to start thinking about building alliances with
firms based in the United States-- American, Japanese, or
European--in order to maximize our industrial needs. [Ref.
2:p. 56]
Hicks quotes Mr. Craig Alderman, former Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense:
Foreign owned U.S. companies are not foreign companies.
They are incorporated in the United States and are subjected
to U.S. laws and regulations, including the Arms Export
Control Act and Export Administration Act. [Ref. 2:p. 56]
One view of foreign investment is that it brings a sig-
nificant amount of new life into a company that could be
1ailiig for _ wide ,ariety of reasons, from lack of manaqement
skills to an increase in research and development (R&D)
funding. Many foreign governments look upon the United States
as a safe haven for investments with a very stable government
and an educated, diversified work force.
Foreign ownership of U.S. defense firms is another example
of the way in which foreign companies are attempting to
restructure and diversify. Investment in a U.S.-based defense
contractor (particularly before 1992, when the European
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Community will drop all trade barriers among member countries
and become a significant world economic power) can have great
benefit especially if the company is able to convert some of
this technology from military to commeicial use such as
aeronautics, or semiconductors. [Ref. 2:p. 563
In his article, "Foreign Ownership of Defense Firms Boosts
U.S. Security," Donald Hicks contends that, "In the overall
scheme of things foreign investment should be encouraged in
U.S. defense firms; there is no risk of foreign capital
invasion." [Ref. 2:p. 58] Despite an overall increase in
foreign investment, Hicks asserts that foreign investment
accounts for only five percent of total U.S. assets. [Ref.
2:p. 60]
He gives three reasons why foreign companies should be
allowed to invest in U.S. defense companies:
- These investments create alliances for American firms and
u.S. firms under foreign control. As a result, when we
go outside the U.S. to compete procurement opportunities
we have a natural advocate.
- When th2 U.S. argues fc more open investrent in the
GATT, we gain more credibility in NATO if our shores are
open to foreign capital.
- By exposing American workers to foreign business prac-
tices and technologies we become better prepared to




The opposing side of this argument is that foreign invest-
ment should be controlled and that Americans need to be aware
of this ever increasing dominance of our markets.
The United States is very different in the world markets
in that until the passage of the Exon-Florio amendment (which
gave the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) new power in reviewing foreign acquisitions and is
explained in Chapter III), reporting requirements on foreign
investment were very lax or non existent. [Ref. 3:p. 95]
As trade barriers hecame more of a national issue,
policymakers began to notice inequities in investment
relationships. Congress became concerned that America's open
door policy to investment was not universally reciprocated.
Japan was identified as a major offender. Most other nations
do impose tight restrictions on investments that can be made
by foreigners. A few examples of these restrictions are areas
which might have an adverse affect on national security
implications such as defense, communications, and real estate.
Other non-tariff barriers include artificial performance
requirements, unnecessary regulations, requirements for joint
ventures, restrictions on work permits, and lack of coopera-
tion. LRef. l:p. 12]
Foreign ownership of U.S. defense firms is not entirely
risk-free. The Japanese in particular do not pursue as mucn
research and development within the U.S. as they do within the
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borders of Japan. A General Accounting Office study cited key
examples of this research and development stance by the
Japanese which occurred during the development of the FSX
fighter. The Japanese wanted a greater role in the R&D
effort. After attaining this goal, the Japanese proceeded to
divide up the different components of the fighter among all or
their top manufacturing firms. With civilian aerospace as a
new target for the Japanese, the only significant skill they
lack is system integration. Because of the structure of the
Memorandum of Understanding they are aided in this work by the
U.S. prime contractor, General Dynamics. In the future this
will give the Japanese an ability to manufacture the entire
product within their borders and possibly use that technology
as a springboard for commercialization. [Ref. 4:pp. 26-27]
Another aspect of the Japanese business philosophy is to
import top management and suppliers from Japan rather than
using American resources. This circumvention of U.S. talent
and resources has serious implications on the ability of firms
to reinvest in capital expansion and R&D efforts. [Ref. l:p.
14]
The process of restructuring and globalization that many
American defense firms are going through is not unlike the
rest of the American economy. Many economists feel that this
"efficiency and consumer welfare" are necessary for world
markets to function. This "laissez-faire" approach to Defense
Department demands and the need for maintaining national
7
security has many U.S. national security analysts worried.
Their argument is that the "increasing dependence of U.S.
industries on foreign sourced hardware and technology severely
limits our capacity to build or replace critical force
structure independent of economic and political decisions of
other sovereign powers". [Ref. 5:p. 2]
Theodore Moran presents some considerations that the
Uniced States should look to in considering the amount of
foreign investment. These lessons were developed from the
European struggle involving dependency on foreign companies
and foreign technology.
First, there are dangers hidden in the globalization of
industry critical to the functioning of modern nation states.
These risks prove to be unacceptable even in peacetime
relations among allies. It is not logical for a modern nation
state to dismiss the problem of industrial dependency as
liberal economic tradition advocates, by arguing that markets
should be allowed to simply adjust themselves.
Secondly, a diversification and multiplication of com-
panies and locales that a nation can draw on offers the most
dependable method for minimizing the risk from foreign
control.
Thirdly, the impulse of autarky, as Moran contends, though
appealing, carries with it its own perils of higher cost,
limited R&D innovation, and delay in deploying weapons. But
it also offers the possibility of being locked into
8
unacceptable performance requirements attuned to narrow
interests that have an impact only on national security.
[Ref. 3:p. 69]
The threat posed by foreign investment can then be under-
stood and evaluated as arising in a few key industries
critical to national security which can be reviewed by
security analysts and economists. As the number of suppliers
increases, the potential for foreign control decreases in
direct proportion to the proliferation of suppliers. A broad
description of the industrial base was assumed by the European
analysts. Their definition of the industrial base was any
good, service, component, or input to the national economy
whose denial could plausibly damage the security interests of
the state. [Ref. 3:p. 70] This broad definition helps lay
the groundwork for criteria that incorporate industries that
should be covered by special policy measures.
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II. THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY: A NATIONAL CONCERN
With the invention of the transistor at Bell Laboratories
in 1947, the United States began four decades of leadership in
the microelectronics field. With tremendous economic
resources and superior technological advantages, the U.S.
fostered an open exchange of ideas among all friendly nations
of the free world. Along with this exchange of ideas, America
has also offered a tremendous market for business and consumer
products. [Ref. 6:p. 1]
The semiconductor industry in the United States is at a
crossroads. Our technological leadership during the initial
stages of this industry was clearly evident, with the early
1970's being completely dominated by American companies such
as Texas Instruments, Intel, Rockwell and a host of others.
In 1970, when the first integrated chip was developed, the
Japanese share of the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
market place was zero. Eighteen years later, in 1988, the
Japanese market share was approximately 80 percent. The
significance of this figure is in the fact that the majority
of technological advances occur in the DRAM field because
memory drives this progress in areas of process control and
manufacturing. [Ref. 7:pp. 9-10]
The importance of the U.S. loss of market position in this
very important technology is evident by reduced revenues,
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which have a "snowball" effect on the amount of money spent
for capital investment and also a reduction in the amount of
R&D spending. As is evident from this cycle, a downward
spiral soon develops which, if not altered becomes very hard
to reverse. [Ref. 7:p. 10]
Mr. Donald J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense, had the
following comments on the vitality of the U.S. microelec-
tronics industry:
Current trends suggest that we are losing ground rapidly
in a growing number of related microelectronics fabrication
technologies. These shifts are due in large part to the
fact that while U.S. firms spend only about 15 percent of
their sales on semiconductor research, Japanese firms invest
double that amount. Where their own research is
insufficient, they invest in U.S. companies and U.S.
academic research to obtain technology. [Ref. 8:p. 13]
Atwood concluded that, "by the year 2000, the U.S could be
totally dependent on Japanese supplies of key electronic
equipment." [Ref. 8:p. 13]
Sony chairman Akio Morita and former Japanese minister
Shintaro Ishihara highlighted the growing issue of Japan's
pivotal role in developing leading-edge military electronics
technology that contributes to the global balance of power.
They argue that because Japan has such advanced production
skills, their semiconductors have achieved a level of
sophistication unmatched anywhere. Their contention is that
the U.S. could become almost totally dependent on Japanese
manufactured chips. [Ref. 9:p. 23)
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In years past the United States has been recognized as a
world leader in virtually all military critical technologies.
[Ref. 10:p. 1] The specter of foreign investment as a
national security issue was never really assessed, and in fact
considered a good thing by iany parties from academia to
industry.
There are different perspectives as to the proper amount
and degree of foreign investment. The liberal economic
perspective is one of letting markets function on their own.
The other theory is one that is espoused by the national
security analysts. Although this was discussed earlier in the
paper it is important to recall those views for comparison
with the view of the National Semiconductor Association.
The official view of the National Semiconductor
Association is to encourage foreign investment. The
Association argues that:
The net inflow of foreign capital into the United States has
increased substantially in the last six years. There is a
growing dependence on foreign capital to make up for the
shortfall of domestic savings. Disrupting inflows of
foreign capital could have disastrous consequences for the
United States. [Ref. 7: p. 26]
Although capital is an important item to consider, it is
also imperative to look at the effect foreign investment could
have upon the national security. In further discussion the
Association proposes the following;
Foreign purchases of U.S. corporate assets--especially in
strategically sensitive industries such as electronics--are
causing concerns that the United States is mortgaging its
economic future.
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Although they oppose all current oversight authority such
as CFIUS, there is a dichotomy in the Association's viewpoint.
On the one hand, they acknowledge U.S. dependence on foreign
investment. This reliance has occurred due to of a lack of
investment capability by U.S. firms and investment companies.
This stems from a variety of reasons, including low personal
savings, double taxation of corporate profits, leveraged
buyouts, the concept of immediate profitability, low tax
credits for R&D work, and the cost of capital. In short, the
majority of U.S. firms are geared toward the immediate
satisfaction of the stockholders. The American attitude of
"what have you done for me in the last quarter" prevails.
However, they fear the dire consequences to national
security of heavy foreign investment. With a recognition of
this problem in the early 1980's, the Defense Science Board
Task Force on Defense Semiconductor Dependency completed a
study in February of 1987. The Task Force's report had a
tremendous impact on the way American companies do business,
with many of their recommendations applied by industry and
DoD.
In the subsequent 18 months, two significant events would
take place from these recommendations. One was the establish-
ment of SEMATECH, a not for profit research institute that
receives financing from the Department of Defense and from its
14-member institutions. The second was the passage of the
Exon-Florio Amendment.
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III. EXON-FLORIO: A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
With convincing debate from national security analysts and
free market economists concerning the implications of foreign
direct investment in the defense industrial base, Congress
took keen interest in the subject. Foreign acquisition of
U.S. high technology firms from 1981 to 1986 had increased
from approximately 30 to more than 130 per year. [Ref. ll:p.
6] The Congressional response was to give the U.S. Govern-
ment's screening mechanism, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), more power. This
power was imparted through the Exon-Florio Amendment.
The Exon-Florio Amendment was attached to the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This amendment,
section 5021, became section 721 of the Defense Production
Act. The agreement that resulted from conference gave the
President (or his designee) the power to review all mergers,
acquisitions or takeovers proposed or pending on or after the
enactment of the legislation. The legislation states further
that this investigation will review all actions that give
foreign persons control of a U.S. company engaged in
interstate commerce. [Ref. 12:pp. 942-928]
Executive Order 12662 of December 27, 1988 designated the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
14
to receive all notices and inquiries to determine whether
investigations should be undertaken, and once an investigation
has been completed, to prepare a report and a recommendation
to the Presideri-. Merbership in CFIUS includes the
Secretaries of State, Defense and Commerce, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, and the United States Trade
Representative as permanent members. Other agencies are
included when a notification raises questions within their
specific area of expertise (e.g., NASA or Department of
Energy). [Ref. 13:p. 2]
In its review process CFIUS has the responsibility to
determine that:
1) There is credible evidence that leads the President to
believe that the foreign interest exercising control might
take action that threatens to impair the national security,
and
2) Provisions of law, other than this section and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEP) do not in
the President's judgement provide adequate and appropriate
authority for the President to protect the national security
in the matter before the President. [Ref. 14]
The Conference report set a standard for review, namely
"national security." National security is not defined in
terms of the Defense Production Act, but the legislative
history states that national security is to be broadly
defined, "without limitation to particular industries." The
Congress rejected proposals to expand the statute's cnvP-rae
to include threats to "essential commerce" and "economic
15
welfare." The intent of the conferees was not to discour~ne
foreign investment, but to review foreign investment on items
that had a potential to affect national security. [Ref. 15:p.
3]
Some items delineated were: the capability and capacity
of domestic industries to Tneet national defense require-
ments, including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, materials, and other suppliez and
services; and the control of domestic industries and
commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the
capability and capacity of the United States to meet the
requirements of national security. [Ref. 12:p. 926]
Through regulation, the Department of the Treasury has
esi.amii~et two types of reporting requirements. The first is
a voluntary disclosure by the firm being acquired. The second
is a request by a member of CFIUS to review a specific
acquisition.[Ref 16] Essentially the Committee has a 30 day
window to determine if the foreign control would be a threat
to national security based on the criteria set forth in the
amendment.
If it is determined that the investment will not meet the
criteria, the Committee will notify the parties involved of
its intent not to carry out an investigation. If it is deter-
mined by the Committee that the investment does require
further review, there is a 45 day timeframe to conduct further
investigation. After the 45 day period, the Committee will
report to the President the results of its findings and
present any recommendations. If unanimous consent is not
achieved by the Committee, then the Chairman will present a
16
report to the President summarizing the different views.
[Ref. 16]
As of March 1990, CFIUS has undertaken only seven formal
investigations from a total of over 350 filings. Two of the
cases have resulted in notification being withdrawn with
CFIUS' permission. One investigation is in progress. Four
have reached the President's desk. He has exercised his
divestiture authority in only one of these cases. [Ref. 13:p.
3]
The majority of cases reported to CFIUS are not in the
category of a threat to national security. However, it is
vital to national security that the effectiveness and the
intent of Exon-Florio not be diminished.
The Exon-Florio amendment had attached to it a sunset
clause, meaning that it was due to be reviewed aid debated for
continuing implementation or possibly to let it expire.
During the past year, Congress failed to renew this
amendment. Discussions with staff members of CFIUS indicate
that they are still functioning as before but operating under
Executive Order 11858 which formed CFIUS. The staff is still
accepting reports of investment from U.S. companies that are
being acquired by foreign concerns. However, Executive Order
11858 only established CFIUS; legislative power, meaning the
reporting requirements, was provided by Exon-Florio. Without
Exon-Florio, and with it the threat of divestiture, many
17
foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms would continue to take
place with virtually no review process.
The staff at CFIUS fully expect that the law will be re-
viewed and will be included in new legislation when the 102nd
Congress convenes in January.1
'This information was obtained from telephone interviews
held with staff officials from the Department of Treasury,
Office of International Affairs, Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States. Some members of Congress
wanted to expand the purpose of the Exon-Florio Amendment by
having it include stricter provisions as to where raw
raterials could be purchased. The Administration did not
a-'ree with this provision and others in conference, so Exon-
Florio was one section of the Defense Production Act that did
not get passed.
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IV. U.S. FIRMS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY THAT
WERE PURCHASED BY FOREIGN CONCERNS
With the creation of CFIUS in May of 1975 by Executive
Order 11858, it was thought that there would now be an agency
which had broad powers to review foreign investment in the
United States.
The requirement for reporting to CFIUS was if a case had
"national interest," which usually meant investment by a
foreign government and was typically associated with large
companies. A few examples of this reporting are Renault pur-
chasing Mac Truck, and the Kuwaitis purchasing a very large
retail chain of service stations. [Ref. 17] However, the
majority of small non-government owned firms failed to
acknowledge the reporting requirements and it was not until
passage of the Exon-Florio amendment in 1988 that reporting
requirements were established in legislation. Exon-Florio
called for divestment of the completed transaction if the law
was not followed. [Ref. 18] To date the President has
ordered divestiture in the sale of only one company. This
transaction involved the People's Republic of China and their
purchase of an aviation parts manufacturer.
This chapter will review the purchase by foreign concerns
of seven semiconductor companies which occurred prior to the
passage of Exon-Florio. This researcher selected the
19
semiconductor industry for the reason that at one time the
U.S. was the leader in technology. As referenced earlier, our
world market share is roughly 15 percent in the DRAM field, a
very critical area for technology advancements. Semiconduc-
tors are the leading edge of a great many technological
advancements, including those critical for defense. Without
this important industry, a deep chasm develops between
technology takers and technology creators. All of these
companies were reported to CFIUS as purchased by foreign con-
cerns. Industries are classified by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) and as such are listed under these codes
by CFIUS.
A. STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
States have varied reporting requirements as to the pur-
chase or transfer of companies. Some states, such as
Pennsylvania, Florida, Delaware and New Jersey do not require
information reporting the sale or transfer of a company.
Their only requirement is that in the case of merger,
dissolution, or name change, a document must be filed with the
bureau in each stdte responsible for corporate transactions.
No other conditions are specified, nor is the acquiring
corporation named.'
'in telephone interviews with representatives of each
Bureau of Corporate Information (this is used as a generic
term for expediency), Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and
Florida, had the least stringent reporting requirements. All
four of these states required minimal information for any type
20
The state of Nevada requires that in the event of a sale
or merger, the State Department of Corporate Information must
be notified. The name of the company President must also be
included in this report along with the name change or sale.
The name of the newly formed company is the only information
required when a transaction takes place. The company that
acquires a firm based in Nevada is not required to give its
name nor any other information.2
California requires that for each individual title trans-
action within a company, a report must be made to the
Department of State, Capital Acquisition Bureau. This report
includes the name of the company acquired as well as the name
of the acquiring company. Other information required is the
name of the chief executive officer, registered agent, and
addresses for both.3
of corporate merger or dissolution. Notification of corporate
transfer or sale was not required in any of the above
mentioned states and when asked about that requirement, all of
the representatives said that once a corporation is estab-
lished a sale or transfer can occur without any notification.
Information was available as to the names of the Presidents or
CEOs; and all of the states did make available the names of
the resident agents.
2All information was obtained Lhrough telephoije interviews
with representatives of the Nevada Department of State
Corporate Information Bureau. The state of Nevada requires
that all information regarding sale, merger, or transfer be
reported to the state. If the company goes out of business a
report is not required. Information is also available as to
the name of the President or CEO of the corporation.
3Information was obtained through telephone interviews
with representatives of the California Department of State,
Capital Acquisition Bureau. The state of California has the
21
B. EVALUATION CRITERIA
The companies ident ied for this research were all
reported to CFIUS as being in the semiconductor field and
acquired by foreign firms. These companies were acquired
prior to the passage of Exon-Florio. They include:
- Vernet Company.
- IMC Magnetic Corporation.
- Gain Electronics Incorporated.




Of the companies identified for this research, Vernet,
IMC, Exel, and Zymos are currently in business. The other
companies, Gain, Electro Tech, and Powerex are no longer in
existence at the addresses filed when incorporated. Further
research of the county records and Better Business Bureaus,
indicated that these companies had gone out of business.
Of the companies still in existence the following
questions were asked to determine the impact of foreign
acquisition on the availability of these companies to the
defense industrial base:
most stringent requirements of all states mentioned in this
thesis. The state requires that all information on merger,
sale, transfer, and dissolution be recorded. The state also
maintains files as to the primary business of the company.
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- Do you currently have contracts with the Department of
Defense (DoD)?
- If not, are you actively seeking DoD contracts?
If you do business with DoD, what percentage are prime
contracts and what percentage are subcontracts with DoD
prime contractors?
C. ANALYSIS OF COMPANIES
1. Vernet Co.
Vernet Co., was formerly located in San Diego,
California. It was purchased in 1986 by Vertex Inc., of
Japan. Currently the company is located in Torrance,
California. The purchase date reported to CFIUS concurs with
that which the State of California currently holds on record
as August 18, 1986. However, on September 1, 1989, the
company was suspended by the California Franchise Tax Board
for tax improprieties and on March 1, 1990 the resident agent
resigned. The resident agent is usually an outside legal
consultant. The Chief Executive Officer is Japanese and
resides in Tokyo. [Ref. 20]
The majority of this company's work is as a subcon-
tractor to large defense prime contractors. These include
IBM, Lockheed, Hughes, General Dynamics and others.
Approximately three percent of their total sales are directly
to DoD.
Currently they do no research and development. Their
work is primarily as a distributor for products manufactured
by the parent company in Japan. [Ref. 21]
23
2. IMC MaQnetic Corporation
IMC is located in Miami Lakes, Florida and was
purchased by Mineba Co. Ltd., of Japan. The Department of
State in Florida has no requirements for recording a sale or
transfer of a corporate entity within the state. The only
requirements are that if merger, dissolution, or name change
takes place, a record must be made with the Department of
Corporations. This record usually entails the filing of the
annual report, along with the required form for official
change of name. Also included in this filing are the names
and addresses of the current director, executive secretary,
and the registered agent. The registered agent controls
access to any and all information about the company, thus
keeping information confidential.
IMC had an amendment to their name on June 17, 1985.
This amendment occurred in the same year that the transaction
was reported to CFIUS. On August 9, 1990, the name was again
changed to IMC Power Systems, Inc. [Ref. 22]
Discussions with personnel at the company revealed
that IMC had really split the company into two divisions. One
division was doing manufacturing and the other division was
doing assembly of component type items. The division which
does the assembly work is a subcontractor with major DoD prime
contractors such as IBM, Lockheed, Hughes and General
Dynamics. They do not sell directly to DoD.
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No research is currently carried out at either of the
sites. Senior officials at the company declined to discuss
topics that they considered confidential, i.e., research.
They did acknowledge that IMC was purchased by Mineba Co,
Ltd., of Japan. [Ref. 23]
3. Gain Electronics Inc.
Formerly located in Branchberg, New Jersey, Gain was
purchased by Mitsui and Co. Ltd., of Japan. The original name
of Gain was Dingle Electronics.
The records show that Dingle Electronics was incor-
porated on October 7, 1985. On October 21, 1985, Dingle
Electronics became Gain Electronics Inc., and under New Jersey
law it was reported as being owned by a foreign concern. The
last annual report filed with the New Jersey Department of
State was September 27, 1988. [Ref. 24] Calls to Gain
Electronics have proved unfruitful. It appears that they have
closed down and are no longer in existence. The address given
for the former President of the company, Raymond P. Dingle, is
no longer in existence.
4. Electro Tech Inc.
Records show that this company is located in Las
Vegas, Nevada. This company was purchased in 1985 by UNITECH
PLC of Great Britain. The lack of reporting requirements in
Nevada has resulted in a lack of information. Deficiencies of
current and correct addresses and phone numbers filed with the
Department of State, Division of Commercial Transactions have
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been a significant obstruction in obtaining information on
this company. This corporation is no longer in existence and
there is no other means available of determining their current
status. [Ref. 19]
5. Powerex Inc.
Formerly located in Youngwood, Pennsylvania, Powerex
was purchased by Misubishi Electronics Inc., of Japan. The
company is shown as a foreign concern with the Pennsylvania
State Department, Corporation Bureau. The company is not
registered as a Pennsylvania corporation, but rather as a
Delaware corporation. This means that the company is
qualified to incorporate within the state of Pennsylvania but
the home office is located in Delaware.
Qualification requires a company to file two forms,
a docketing certificate which is strictly for tax purposes,
and a certificate of authority, which stays as a record with
the Corporation Bureau.
The Pennsylvania Corporation Bureau shows that the
company qualified for corporate status on April 23, 1986. A
legal firm, C.T. Corporation Systems of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylania, is their registered agent in that state. In
discussions with officials from C.T. Corporation Systems, they
indicated that C.T. Corporation Systems was a firm that
specializes in qualifying corporations from outside of
Pennsylvania for incorporation within Pennsylvania. [Ref. 25]
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Delaware's State Department of Corporate Information
shows the company in good standing, with an official incor-
poration date of August 23, 1985. This date coincides with
the filings with CFIUS. The corporation is set up through a
registered agent. That agent is The Corporation Trust
Company, located in Wilmington, Delaware. Officials of the
registered agent declined to discuss any facts concerning
Powerex, Inc. They cited client confidentiality as their
reasons.
The state of Delaware does not require any information
as to the sale or transfer of a corporation. The only
information required is for mergers, dissolution or the change
of corporate officers. State laws would only permit informa-
tion to be provided regarding such matters as the standing of
a company, its registered agent, and stock status. [Ref. 26]
6. Exel Micro Electronics
Exel Micro Electronics was formerly located in San
Jose, California. This company was incorporated on February
22, 1983 as Omniquest, Inc. On April 5, 1983 the name of the
corporation was changed to Exel Micro Electronics. Later that
year the Rohm Corporation purchased Exel but did not change
its name. On March 27, 1990 Exel merged with the Rohm
Corporation and on March 28, 1990 the merger was formalized
with the state of California.
Exel was originally located in San Jose, California
and is still listed as being active with a permanent address
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in San Jose. However, they have since close, down in San Jose
and moved to Irvine, California. The Chief Executive Officer
is Japanese and he resides in Tokyo. The resident agent is
Japanese and resides in the Los Angeles area. There is also
a resident agent located in San Jose.
As of this writing officials from what is now the Rohm
Corporation have refused interviews with the researcher. The
resident agents will only acknowledge the information that was
obtained through the California State Department of Capital
Acquisition. [Ref. 20]
7. Zymos Corporation
Zymos Corporation is located in Sunnyvale, California.
The company incorporated in the state of Delaware on October
29, 1986, and became incorporated in California on February
26, 1987. Because this firm was originally incorporated in
Delaware, the state of California has no record of
incorporation prior to 1987. The Corporation Trust Company of
Wilmington, Delaware also was involved in the transactions for
this firm.
The company that filed with CFIUS is the Daewood
Corporation of Japan. Calls to the company in Sunnyvale,
California indicated hat they no longer sell to DoD or to
major prime contractors other than IBM. The company states
that all of their work is commercial. [Ref. 27]
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D. SUMMARY
The research for this chapter proved to be quite varied
and interesting. Four of the seven firms acquired by foreign
interests were still in business. Two of these companies
continued to have business dealings with DoD or with major DoD
prime ontr actors. One company did not wish to involve itself
with this research and therefore would not discuss its
business base. The fourth company no longer did business with
DoD or with any DoD prime contractors. They indicated that
all of their sales were for commercial products.
The information gathered concerning the incorporation of
firms proved to be important in attempting to answer the
primary thesis question. Further research in this area could
prove to be very beneficial in tracking firms that may have
been acquired by foreign concerns and are critical to the
industrial base.
The incorporation of a firm in this country is very easy
for any one with the necessary legal expertise. By examining
each state's method of recording the incorporation of busi-
ness, it is concluded that it is very simple to move
corporations within the state or to another state as
conditions warrant without the state's knowledge. Since
states do not track a firm once it leaves their jurisdiction,
it is pos ible for a firm to move offshore without notifying
any government authority. As different states compete for
valuable resources from companies, i.e., employment and
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investment, one could conclude that reporting requirements for
incorporation might be relaxed in order to foster investment.
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V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study was to examine foreign
investment in a segment of the defense industrial base (DIB)
and to assess its impact. Another objective was to evaluate
the potential of the Exon-Florio Amendment as a remedy for
foreign acquisition in cases with adverse implications for
national security. The principal findings were developed
through a literature review and non-attribution telephone
interviews with the companies involved, with staff members of
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) and staff members from the Office of Industrial Base
Assessment. This research has produced several findings
relevant to the DIB and to the effectiveness of Exon-Florio.
B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary research question was, What is the effect of
foreign acquisition of U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturing
companies on the defense industrial base (DIB)? Findings
which pertain to the subsidiary research questions are
addressed as part of the discussion of general findings and
conclusions.
Seven companies were surveyed for this thesis. Three of
the companies were very cooperative. One company refused to
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participate in the research, while the remaining three had
gone out of business at some point in the past five or six
years. Of the three companies that participated in this
thesis two were currently contracting as a DoD prime or as a
subcontractor to major DoD prime contractors. The third
company no longer did DoD work and was dedicated to commercial
work.
It is likely that those companies which had gone out of
business did so for one of two reasons. The new foreign
owners may have moved the entire company off-shore for R&D and
production. The R&D and manufacturing expertise represented
by these companies is no longer available in this country.
This finding supports the view that critical industries are
being lost to the DIB as a result of foreign acquisition. The
other argument is that of the free market or "laissez-faire"
approach. This view would assume that thne companies that were
no longer in business had been poorly managed and succumbed to
market forces.
It was not possible to determine which explanation was
applicable to the semiconductor companies surveyed for this
thesis. This is a major problem in evaluating the impact of
foreign acquisition. It is not clear that foreign acquisition
"causes" companies to disappear from the DIB.
Determining the effect of foreign acquisition on the U.S.
DIB is further complicated by the sample sizes and time frames
available for this research. The time frame used here was the
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two year period of 1985 and 1986. Clearly, a study that
encompassed a longer period--perhaps a decade--might reveal
other findings or alter the findings of this thesis.
Exon-Florio was established as a reaction to a serious
concern, the rising amount of foreign investment in the U.S.
The original charter of CFIUS was to review transactions that
affected the "national interest." The legislative power of
Exon-Florio significantly increased the leverage of CFIUS.
The amendment directed CFIUS to review all transactions that
had national security implications. Prior to Exon-Florio
there was no enforcement vehicle if companies failed to report
a sale to a foreign concern. The amendment provided the
threat of divestment in cases of non-compliance. This
legislation is a step in the right direction but does not go
far enough in successfully monitoring foreign investment
Each state has records concerning the incorporation of
various entities. Due to the sheer volume of filings each
year, many requirements for reporting transactions go unre-
ported by corporations for a variety of reasons. These
include ignorance of the law, not taking the time to complete
the required paper work, and possibly just to conceal a
company for tax purposes.
States do not require notification of certain transactions
that take place such as a sale. This was the case in every
state surveyed with the exception of California. Although
reporting requirements for merger, transfer, and name change
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do exist, state regulators learn if a company opens up for
operations only when these companies apply for a tax
identification number and subsequently file tax returns.
There is no adequate data base available to monitor
foreign companies and their manufacturing capability.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Firms which are acquired by a foreign concern should be
accounted for differently than those which are domestic. When
purchased by a foreign concern, a company in an industry such
as semiconductors, which is critical to the DIB as well as the
industrial base (IB), should be required to report all
corporate transactions to the federal government, specifically
CFIUS.
If the company moves out of state, that move should be
documented and forwarded to the next state of incorporation.
Presently, when a corporation moves from one state to another,
they are able to move the research or manufacturing work but
keep an address indicating a continued existence in that state
although there may be no work being done there.
CFIUS should also be notified of moves between states. In
discussions with staff members of CFIUS, it became evident
that there was no way for the staff to know what happened to
a foreign owned company following acquisition and completion
of the investigation.
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When a foreign company acquires a U.S. firm, a requirement
should exist for reporting to CFIUS where research and
manufacturing will take place. This researcher is
recommending that CFIUS monitor what the company is
manufacturing (if it is critical to national security) , and
whether they are taking that manufacturing ability out of the
U.S.
CFIUS would notify each state of the name and manufactur-
ing ability of each company. To minimize the amount of data
coming into CFIUS, each state would report back to CFIUS on a
yearly basis of the standing of the firm and the manufacturing
work it is performing in that state.
The effectiveness of Exon-Florio should be reviewed. Once
CFIUS rules on the transaction, the trail of the company is
essentially lost. Policy makers need to look at the corporate
reporting requirements of the states to develop an effective
plan for monitoring foreign companies. CFIUS has no way of
knowing the extent of an adverse impact on the DIB.
A broader study of this situation should be undertaken.
A review of all semiconductor companies purchased by foreign
concerns in the past ten years would show some evidence of
what technological and manufacturing capability still exists
in this country.
The key to a broader review would be to limit the analysis
to a single industry. The sample size would be large enough
to offer some facts yet small enough to work effectively.
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D. SUMMARY
The requirements for a foreign firm reporting to CFIUS are
modest. The majority of foreign governments place many more
constraints on foreign investment than does the U.S. Although
these reporting requirements may be viewed by many as
protectionist measures, a balance needs to be struck between
the "laissez-faire" theory of economics and national security
concerns. The U.S. has a legitimate interest in the status of
foreign acquired firms.
When this problem is viewed in the proper light, foreign
investment will not be discouraged. The United States still
has wide and varied resources to draw upon. These resources
include raw materials, capital, a strong labor force, and
stability of government. Foreign firms see this country as an
investment opportunity. The United States should welcome that
investment but continue to be concerned with the movement of
technology to foreign shores.
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